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At first blush, contemporary China seems ripe for the rapid development of agricultural 
cooperatives. After all, cooperatives have not only enjoyed a long history in China, but the 
country’s recent experience with agricultural communes should make it more amenable to the 
reestablishment of joint production and spontaneous bottom-up cooperation. Agricultural 
cooperatives in China date to the 1930s, as Rural Reconstruction Movement advocates 
promoted cooperatives as a “third road” between capitalism and socialism. Although Mao’s 
regime disbanded most bottom-up cooperatives, rural cooperatives began to reemerge in rural 
China by the end of the 20th century, particularly after 1998, when farmer cooperatives at the 
grassroots level began increasing markedly in number (Jia, Huang & Xu, 2012). Since the 
1990s, agricultural cooperatives — particularly Farmers’ Specialized Cooperatives (FSCs) — 
have been reinvigorated and experienced rapid expansion in rural China. 
 
 
What is more, since the mid-2000s China’s government has nurtured agricultural 
cooperatives with a number of incentives and supportive policies, particularly the Farmers’ 
Specialized Cooperative Law. Indeed, after the promulgation of the Law, the number of 
registered FSCs across China soared exponentially. By October 2015, China’s Ministry of 
Agriculture reported 1.48 million registered FSCs and about 99.97 million farmer households 
have joined cooperatives, covering 47 percent of the nation’s total (MAC, 2015). This growth 
was cheered by many Chinese and overseas scholars, who argued that cooperatives could 
target specific difficulties that smallholder farmers face in production and marketing as well 
as help them scale. By banding together, smallholders could bargain for cheaper inputs and 
hold out for higher prices of their produce. Cooperatives could help provide technical 
services and marketing channels that individual farmers rarely have on their own (e.g., 
Huang, 2011; Yang, Leeuwis, Lie & Song, 2014; Jia, Huang & Xu, 2012). 
 
 
Yet, despite these theoretical advantages, our evidence is consistent with naysayers who 
argue that — despite all appearances — authentic agricultural cooperatives mainly fail. Many 
studies have shown that the vast majority of Chinese FSCs are not authentic, and their 
performance has been disappointing. Researchers have identified a number of reasons 
regarding the poor performance of FSCs. Some FSCs are dominated by agribusinesses or 
wealthy farmers, others have low participation of small farmers, the lack of dedicated leaders 
lead some FSCs to morph to commercialized entities or fail outright, while others are simply 
established to grab government subsides (e.g., Deng & Wang, 2014; Tong & Wen, 2009; Fan, 
2011; Pan, 2011). 
 
 
Unfortunately, most of the research on cooperatives to date — that of advocates and skeptics 
alike — is flawed by focusing exclusively on one or two features of FSCs, by basing their 
conclusions on a small handful of case studies, or by relying on questionnaires, resulting in 
dubious or self-serving responses. By contrast, our research spans a six-year period (2009–
2015) and covers all of China’s macro-regions, 11 provinces in total — with a total of 45 
cases. In selecting cases, we sought out FSCs that were established as demonstration projects, 
or which had received recognition from the government or media for their success. We 
adopted in-depth interviews as our data collection method, which provided far deeper and 
more comprehensive information than standardized questionnaires. Moreover, we chose to 
apply the definition of cooperatives as set by Chinese law, and not some international 
standard of cooperative (although in practice, the Chinese definition is similar to that used 
internationally). This allows us to evaluate China’s cooperatives on their own terms, using 
the standards established by China. 
 
 
Given that we sought out cases that were listed by the central or provincial governments as 
especially successful model cooperatives, we were surprised to find just one relatively 
successful cooperative in Shanxi Province. This successful cooperative was initiated and 
managed by a dedicated, well-educated leader from the local community, and originated as a 
cultural association before developing into a comprehensive cooperative providing multiple 




Shell FSCs are organizations that should never have been considered to be 
cooperatives. They are frequently registered for the purpose of grabbing state 




We divided the remaining 44 cases into four types of failed cooperatives, including shell 
FSCs (13 cases), commercial FSCs (25 cases), commercialized cooperatives (3 cases), and 
failed cooperatives (3 cases). Shell FSCs are organizations that should never have been 
considered to be cooperatives. Instead, they are literally empty “shells,” without farmer 
members, or services provided. These so called “FSCs” are frequently registered for the 
purpose of grabbing state subsidies or other preferential policies. What we frequently saw 
was only a name plaque hung on the office front door. The low registration threshold and 
lack of inspections can explain the rampancy of shell FSCs. Some interviewees told us that 
one could just borrow five identification cards from friends or relatives to register a 




Similarly, commercial FSCs are actually disguised private enterprises. Most of these “FSCs” 
seem to have met the requirements of an authentic cooperative because they have offices and 
facilities, institutional designs, management framework, membership books, and other 
trappings of an actual cooperative. However, in reality, they are nothing more than a 
commercial enterprise; all their transactions with farmer members are conducted in a 
completely commercialized manner. Although participating in the activities of the FSCs, 
members rarely receive extra benefits from the transactions compared to those with other 
market operators. These FSCs are dominated by and serve a small group of elites or a single 
core leader. The commercial FSCs can be further divided into three subgroups by their 




By contract, commercialized cooperatives started out as authentic cooperatives, but 
subsequently transform into commercial enterprises. Authentic cooperatives frequently 
generate lower profits than commercial enterprises because they have multiple missions to 
fulfill — serving members, distributing dividends, addressing public concerns — which 
combine to weaken their profitability. In turn, lower profitability augments already severe 
challenges to the sustainability of cooperatives. Therefore, in practice, the leaders of these 
cooperative are often tempted by external capital and transform the organization into a 
commercial enterprise controlled by capital instead of the members. In this case, ordinary 
farmer members are marginalized in the decision-making process. 
 
 
Finally, failed cooperatives often started out as authentic cooperatives but failed along their 
life course. The reasons for failure include poor policy support, lack of management skills, 
and unfavorable market conditions. The failure story of Xiajia Cooperative in Jilin Province 
pertinently illustrates this situation. Xiajia started as an authentic and successful cooperative, 
and was selected as a national demonstration cooperative from 2004 to 2014. However, when 
we visited in August 2015, it was completely shut down and the leader had disappeared 
without a trace for six months, her door disquietingly littered with court summons. According 
to interviews with the members and neighboring farmers, the reasons for the failure included 




Thus, our research revealed that the vast majority of FSCs in rural China have failed to 
deliver the expected benefits to agriculture and farmers. By either international or Chinese 
standards, the vast majority of FSCs in China are not authentic cooperatives, but shell 
companies, private businesses, or commercial enterprises. The considerable policy supports 
from the government since the 2000s have been ineffective in fostering a healthy cooperative 
system. Given the failure of even those cooperatives held up as models of authentic bottom-
up organizations that provide significant benefits to ordinary farmers, we remain pessimistic 
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